The Hungarian parliamentary elections are on April 12, and the EU’s united support for Ukraine hangs in the balance. In his fight to remain in power, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán – a vocal opponent of Ukrainian accession to the EU – is hoping that his promise of low energy prices will once again bring him electoral success.
The energy crisis since 2022 has exposed a striking paradox in Hungary’s relationship with the EU. While the Fidesz government under Viktor Orbán sustains its confrontational sovereignty rhetoric for domestic audiences, supply disruptions have repeatedly driven it to seek refuge in the very EU-level coordination it publicly derides. For one of the bloc’s most persistent detractors, this reliance suggests that even Brussels’ loudest critics turn to its collective capacity when domestic stability is at risk.
Energy has long functioned as a political device in the toolbox of Hungary’s ruling party, Fidesz, well before the shocks of 2022. It has been politicised for over a decade, beginning with the thematisation of utility price cuts during the 2013–14 election campaign. While these measures initially responded to genuine electoral grievances linked to rising energy costs, eventually, they became less about material affordability and more about consolidating the incumbent government’s image as the sole protector of low energy prices. In this process, energy policy also helped position the Hungarian prime minister, Viktor Orbán, as an “economic freedom fighter” resisting external pressure from the EU over market liberalisation.
Over time, energy pricing thus became not only a question of domestic welfare but a symbolic battleground in Hungary’s broader sovereignty conflict with the EU. This dynamic was further reinforced after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, which confronted the EU and its member states with inflation, sanctions, and rising energy prices. It was therefore unsurprising that Fidesz’s 2022 election campaign retained the policy element that had ensured its long-standing electoral success, namely, utility price cuts.
Placed in the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, and given that Viktor Orbán was widely perceived as the Russian president’s closest ally within the EU, his promise to safeguard continued access to Russian energy imports appeared credible to large segments of the electorate. . In his press conference following the 2022 electoral victory, Orbán openly questioned the EU’s capacity to manage the economic consequences of the war. He simultaneously justified maintaining close energy relations with Russia, framing this stance as necessary to “protect” Hungarian families from price increases and to oppose sanctions targeting Russian oil and gas imports. As Hungary approaches the 2026 election cycle, this domestic political narrative around energy remains largely unchanged. However, with Fidesz now facing a credible challenger in the Tisza Party, the government has increasingly framed political opponents as a threat to cheap gas arrangements whenever they raise the need for energy supply diversification.
The rhetoric of sovereignty has repeatedly collided with the practical realities of managing energy security during wartime disruption, as seen following Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Hungary’s energy system, like those of many other EU member states, remains structurally tied to cross-border infrastructure that lies beyond its direct political control. This includes the Druzhba (“Friendship”) pipeline, the main route through which Hungary has traditionally received Russian crude oil via Ukraine.
The limits of this sovereigntist rhetoric became apparent almost immediately after the start of the war. When the EU imposed sanctions and an embargo on Russian oil in 2022, Hungary secured an exemption that allowed continued imports through the Druzhba pipeline. Orbán presented the outcome domestically as a victory, stating that the EU proposal to ban Russian oil in Hungary had been “defeated.” Yet the continuation of these imports ultimately depended on a collective decision taken within the EU’s sanctions framework, justified on the grounds of safeguarding the energy security of vulnerable member states. In other words, the policy Hungary relied upon to maintain its energy supplies was not the product of unilateral national decision-making from Budapest but depended on EU-level coordination.
Subsequent episodes of disruption reinforced this same dynamic. In 2024, Ukraine tightened pre-existing sanctions on the Russian oil company Lukoil, affecting shipments transported through the Druzhba pipeline to Central Europe. Hungary warned that the measure could threaten supplies to its refineries. Despite Orbán’s sovereigntist rhetoric, he raised the issue with the European Commission and requested mediation. The dispute quickly moved beyond bilateral relations, with the Commission engaging Ukraine and Hungary to address the implications for oil transit. Following consultations, deliveries resumed through alternative suppliers, allowing pipeline flows to continue. This episode again demonstrated how disruptions to Hungary’s energy supply were quickly shifted into EU-level coordination.
A similar pattern emerged in January 2026, as oil transit through the Druzhba pipeline was once again interrupted after infrastructure damage in Ukraine raised concerns over supplies to Hungary. The disruption prompted the European Commission to convene an extraordinary meeting of its Oil Coordination Group to assess supply risks and coordinate responses among member states, including the release of strategic reserves and the use of alternative routes such as the Adria pipeline. Once again, the management of the crisis shifted into EU-level coordination mechanisms rather than unilateral national action. At the same time, Hungary challenged the EU’s measures restricting Russian energy imports before the Court of Justice of the EU, contesting the policy through the EU’s own legal framework.
In terms of what can be gleaned from this gap between rhetoric and reality, Hungary’s energy politics illustrate a broader feature of European integration. Even governments that openly contest EU authority remain deeply embedded in its institutional and infrastructural frameworks. While Orbán continues to frame energy policy domestically as a struggle for sovereignty, repeated crises have shown that safeguarding Hungary’s energy security ultimately relies on EU coordination mechanisms. As the 2026 elections approach, this tension is likely to persist: sovereignty rhetoric may remain politically useful at home, but managing disruptions will continue to require engagement with the very EU structures the government publicly criticises.
About the Authors:
Léna Zentai is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Fellow at Jagiellonian University within the EUFOG project. Her doctoral research focuses on the European Union’s enlargement policies, with particular attention to the rule of law and its perception and impact in Western Balkan candidate countries.
Oliver Reschreiter is a Marie Skłodowska-Curie Doctoral Fellow at Jagiellonian University within the EUFOG project. His research focuses primarily on energy studies and the geopolitics of renewable energy in the EU, Central Asia, and the South Caucasus.
