Davide Genini (Dublin City University)
Consistent with the conclusions of the European Council in June, the European Commission and the High Representative have presented the first Defence Readiness Roadmap for 2030. This initiative follows the unprecedented rearmament process launched through the ReArm Europe Plan and the White Paper on Defence.
After decades of chronic underinvestment, EU aggregate defence spending has increased from €218 billion in 2021 to €343 billion in 2024—a remarkable 58% rise. However, the new 5% defence expenditure benchmark agreed at the 2025 The Hague NATO Summit will require an additional €288 billion per year. In this context, the 2030 Roadmap aims to equip EU Member States with modern defence capabilities to ensure credible deterrence and an autonomous capacity to respond to Russia’s sustained militarisation—whose defence expenditure reached around 7% of GDP in 2025.
Military Dimension
In the military field, the 2030 Roadmap introduces both a new organisational framework and measures to fill existing strategic and operational shortfalls. Nine Capability Coalitions will be established in 2026, each focusing on a critical domain: air and missile defence, strategic enablers, military mobility, artillery systems, ammunition and missiles, drones and counter-drone systems, artificial intelligence, cyber and electronic warfare, ground combat, and maritime capabilities. Their composition largely mirrors the international capability coalitions formed under the Ukraine Defence Contact Group (UDCG) to coordinate military assistance to Ukraine. In parallel, a Military Mobility Package—to be presented in November 2025—will aim to create interoperable trans-European transport networks through €100 billion in investments, increasing spending from €1.76 billion to €17.65 billion in the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The EU also plans to launch a series of integrated defence flagships, including the European Drone Defence Initiative, Eastern Flank Watch, European Air Shield, and European Space Shield. These projects will be partly financed through the European Defence Industrial Programme (EDIP) and the Security Action for Europe (SAFE). The scope of these initiatives will extend to Ukraine through the creation of a dedicated Drone Alliance, co-financed under the G7-led Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration (ERA) initiative.
Industrial Dimension
On the industrial side, the 2030 Roadmap sets an ambitious trajectory towards large-scale production capacity, structured around four major objectives. First, joint procurement should reach 40% of total EU defence acquisitions by the end of 2027—three years ahead of the target established in the European Defence Industrial Strategy. The extension of the SAFE framework to the United Kingdom, Ukraine, and Canada illustrates the EU’s capacity to project its procurement model through global partnerships. Second, the EU seeks to enhance its technological edge through financial instruments included in the 2028–2034 MFF, notably the EU Competitiveness Fund and Horizon Europe. In this context, the re-skilling of 600,000 workers for the defence industry by 2030 represents a crucial element of the EU’s industrial transformation. Third, the EU aims to consolidate strategic sovereignty through a more autonomous approach to defence production, building on risk assessments from the Observatory of Critical Technologies and leveraging the opportunities offered by the Critical Raw Materials Act. Fourth, the Roadmap envisages the creation of a genuine Single Market for Defence by launching a regulatory simplification process under the Defence Readiness Omnibus, to be finalised by the end of 2025.
Moving away from the European Defence Union
The 2030 Roadmap adopts an incremental approach reminiscent of previous integration processes such as the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary Union. The Commission and the High Representative will present an Annual Defence Readiness Report every October to inform the European Council of progress achieved on the Roadmap’s deliverables. However, the analogy with economic integration has clear limits. Defence policy concerns matters of life and death—issues that reach the existential core of states. Consequently, the establishment of a European Defence Union cannot rest solely on political ambition or intergovernmental consensus. It requires a robust system of democratic accountability, particularly through the European Parliament, and a genuine link between power and responsibility—something that only a supranational entity such as the European Commission can ultimately guarantee.
Yet, the 2030 Roadmap marks a clear departure from that earlier aspiration. It consolidates an intergovernmental framework in which participation remains voluntary. ‘Willingness’ has become the defining term of the EU defence policy: Member States may join Capability Coalitions and EU programmes at their discretion, but without binding obligations. The period when the Commission could proclaim the creation of a European Defence Union as a political priority for its is now fading. What emerges instead is a more sober reality—one shaped by the persistence of national defence interests and a cautious approach to sovereignty pooling. The 2030 Roadmap therefore encapsulates both the progress towards a more defence-capable Union and the enduring reluctance of Member States to cede one of the most fundamental attributes of their sovereignty.
Davide Genini is a PhD candidate in EU Law at Dublin City University. His research focuses on EU-US foreign and security law, defence industrial law and NATO law.
Photo: @EUSec_Defence
