Tilman Voss (Jagiellonian University in Krakow)
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has constituted a gamechanger for EU enlargement, which has since February 2022 seemingly gained a “momentum” with a focus on the Eastern Neighbourhood and the Western Balkans. The dynamic which raised the number of EU candidate countries to a total of nine has been met with considerable optimism, but also raised questions about its nature and characteristics. In this context, the current momentum is often considered to be a consequence of geopolitical realities: while the “Eastern Trio” is entangled in territorial disputes or interstate war, Western Balkan countries are exposed to growing hybrid threats and influence from third countries, which has in turn heightened the EU’s interest to keep them “close” and foster their integration. Next to these geopolitical motives, the new enlargement wave is also marked by the EU’s increased financial involvement. Most importantly, however, the current momentum has altered the policy first and foremost discursively, and might yet overcome the discursive opposition which had been growing in the years prior to the invasion. To provide possible evidence of this alleged transformation, it is worth looking into the discursive sphere to detect possible changes in contestation.
The European Parliament’s Role in EU Enlargement and Forms of Enlargement Contestation
The European Parliament (EP) possesses a relatively small role in the enlargement process, but its direct as well as its indirect influence is not to be underestimated. When it comes to party groups’ views on EU enlargement, the EPP (European People’s Party), S&D (Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), G/EFA (Greens/European Free Alliance) and Renew Europe are traditionally supportive of it, whereas Eurosceptic and radical party groups such as the ECR (European Conservatives and Reformists), ID (Identity and Democracy, ESN and PfE after 2024) and GUE/NGL (The Left) hold a more critical view or right-out reject it. In the context of enlargement, the EP followed the tendency of increased opposition together with the arrival of Eurosceptic forces in the EP throughout the 2010s. To illustrate whether this sentiment changed, it is worth looking into the 9th legislature covering the time period right before and after February 2022.
Typically, EU enlargement contestation mirrors the general conflict between EU widening and deepening, with five groups of arguments commonly distinguished between:
– Utility-based: Used positively, these arguments highlight the expansion of the common market, enabling further economic growth, cohesion, and prosperity. Negatively used, the focus is put on the expectations of high costs due to financial payments by member states, or the wage and employment pressure that new member states might put on old ones upon entering the EU
– Rights-based: These arguments stem from the idea of the EU enlargement as a process based on criteria such as democracy, rule of law, and market freedoms. Thus, it is advocated for or contested based on the (non-)compliance with those criteria or reform (non-)progress in related policy areas.
– Value-based: These arguments either positively invoke the EU’s moral responsibility or duty to permit candidate countries to join the “European family”, based on the claim that a country shares “European values” – or negatively, to reject enlargement based their alleged non-adherence to them.
– Security-based: Positively used, these arguments regard enlargement as a tool contributing to regional, internal or external stability and peace; negatively used, enlargement is rejected based on the assumption that new members might pose a security risk and create instability inside the EU.
– Geopolitics-based: These arguments make the claim that further enlargement gives the EU a stronger voice on the global stage, and is necessary to not lose ground against other external powers. Negatively used, enlargement is claimed to undermine such objectives.
Furthermore, contestation can also mirror criticism of the EU’s institutional structure as a whole.
Enlargement Contestation in the European Parliament – Changes and Continuities
When analysing debates before and after February 2022, five key takeaways emerge:
1) Solid discursive support for enlargement – with growing reservations: 85 to 90 percent of all interventions voiced an explicitly positive opinion of enlargement, or one positive but under conditions. The percentage of conditional statements increased vis-à-vis explicitly positive statements after February 2022, however. Furthermore, the interest for enlargement discussions significantly increased after February 2022: before, one debate was held, seven afterwards.
2) Strong geopolitical undertone, but normative foundations remain vital: Geopolitics-based arguments were the most used when arguing in favour of enlargement. After February 2022, they were also reinforced by a growing number of references towards a necessary foreign policy alignment of candidate countries. The rights-based dimension was very present before 2022 before getting replaced by a strong rise in value-based justifications, especially in the context of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.
3) Utility-based arguments seldom (and rather negatively) used: Despite the EU’s deeper economic engagement in the context of current enlargement efforts, the utility-based argument was the least invoked when advocating for enlargement, but the one most often negatively used.
4) New (contested) topics emerge: Next to foreign policy alignment, the legislature saw more references to a possible EU reform. 30 percent of respective statements hereby rejected such reform and were voiced by MEPs from the GUE/NGL, ID as well as the ECR and EPP. Moreover, the high number of references to bilateral disputes between a member state and a candidate country in direct connection with enlargement throughout the entire legislature is striking.
5) Ambiguous towards Russia, Critical on Enlargement: The majority of MEP interventions from party groups which showed less assertiveness towards Russia after February 2022 were negative towards enlargement, further illustrating the post-2022 profile of Eurosceptic forces in EU foreign policy.
What Fate for the “Enlargement Momentum”?
The increased interest in enlargement, together with the ongoing support inside the EP after February 2022 is a solid indicator of the push the policy received. Furthermore, the rise in positive value-based arguments in the context of Moldova, Ukraine and Georgia after February 2022 shows how the tone and framing of enlargement in the Eastern Neighbourhood had been transformed. Generally, the strong presence of value- and rights-based arguments shows that the new enlargement momentum is – at least discursively – not solely driven by geopolitical motives. Simultaneously, contestation remained a vital element also after February 2022, which supports the idea that the current “enlargement momentum” is not necessarily a turning point with the potential to significantly alter the image and success of enlargement. Instead, significant obstacles remain: the opposition against a purely “geopolitical enlargement” together with warnings against the loss of credibility in the context of conditionality is a prominent example. Similarly, the need of candidate countries to align with the EU’s foreign policy was also subject to significant contestation – and new, contested topics are emerging.
When looking at the overall state of enlargement, there are few tangible results of the momentum despite undeniable advancements, making the period since 2013 the longest period without a country joining the EU since 1973. The freezing of accession negotiations with Georgia, the blockade of Ukraine’s accession process by Hungary over minority rights concerns and a (still) majoritarian yet flagging public support for enlargement attest to a possibly fading momentum. Contestation is here to stay, and it surely isn’t always unwarranted.
Hence, there are several imperatives for the EU to allow future enlargement to be a success. Most importantly, concerns about the EU’s ability to sustain its commitment to democracy, rule of law and human rights in the accession process whilst responding to geopolitical concerns and security threats need to be addressed. This conundrum most evidently plays out in the cases of Georgia, where democratic backsliding has already torpedoed the country’s accession path, and Serbia, where the ongoing protests against governmental injustice and widespread corruption have so far (merely) led to a changed tone in the Commission’s recent enlargement communications. The EU needs to consistently insist on democratic reforms and show both Georgian and Serbian civil society that it stands firmly on their side. Furthermore, concerns about economic divergences need to be accounted for, also through strong strategic communication. Given that research has concluded that enlargement has had a positive effect on the economics of both old and new member states, the analysis’ findings in the context of utility-based arguments show that this fact seems to not have sufficiently translated into strong advocacy based on these matters. What’s more, a Treaty reform needs to be more diligently pursued given the accession of up to nine countries. The same goes for the growing influence of bilateral issues: in this context, the Council’s initiative to abolish the unanimity requirement to open negotiation clusters is a first step – but it mustn’t be the last.
Tilman Voss is a young professional and recent Master’s graduate in European Politics and Society (EPS), a programme completed at Charles University (Prague), Leiden University, and Jagiellonian University in Krakow. His research interests include EU foreign and enlargement policy as well as energy affairs.
